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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“FINDERS KEEPERS, LOSERS WEEPERS”: THE LAW OF FINDING
“LOST” PROPERTY IN MISSOURI

JOSEPH J. SIMEONE*
INTRODUCTION
One would have thought that in the entire history of Missouri, there would
be a great number of scholarly articles on lost property in Missouri. But, alas,
such is not the case. There are a few, however, dealing with some aspects of
this broad and confusing area of the law.1 But research fails to find one article
dealing solely with lost property in Missouri and its legal ramifications.
This small, simple article aims to fill that void. People find things every
day and fall heir to their rights and duties when they do so. I dare say that the
ordinary person—a finder of “lost” goods—knows little (except perhaps,
“finders keepers, losers weepers”) about the obligation to notify the court, the
duty to publish what has been found, or the right the finder has against third
parties who claim the property. This article clarifies such rights and
obligations.
While there are many general articles, notes, and comments dealing with
the subject of finding lost chattels,2 none, to the writer’s knowledge, deal

* Professor Emeritus, Saint Louis University School of Law. B.S., J.D., LL.M., S.J.D. This
article would never have been written but for the urging of Judge Robert Dowd, Jr., of the
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, the son of my colleague Robert Dowd, Sr., who
asked me to find the first draft written in 1955. The original draft was “lost” for years in my files
until recently “found.” It has been brought up to date.
1. See Joseph P. Giljum, A Survey of State Abandoned or Unclaimed Property Statutes, 9
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 85, 108–09 (1964); Elmer M. Million, Sawyer et al. v. Administrator of Injun
Joe, 16 MO. L. REV. 27, 31–32 (1951); Jo Beth Prewitt, Unclaimed Property—A Potential Source
of Non-Tax Revenue, 45 MO. L. REV. 493, 497 (1980).
2. See, e.g., RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 24 (3d ed. 1975);
BARLOW BURKE, PERSONAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 158–95 (2d ed. 1993); WILLIAM L.
PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 88–90 (5th ed. 1984); Ralph W. Aigler,
Rights of Finders, 21 MICH. L. REV. 664 (1923) [hereinafter Aigler, Rights of Finders]; Paul
Finkleman, Fugitive Baseballs and Abandoned Property: Who Owns a Home Run Ball?, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1609 (2003); Roy Moreland, Finders of Lost Property, 16 KY. L.J. 3 (1927);
David Reisman, Jr., Possession and the Law of Finders, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1939); Ralph
W. Aigler, Note, Personal Property—Finding Lost Goods—Rights of Finder and Owner of Locus
in Quo in Lost and Mislaid Personal Property, 21 MINN. L. REV. 191 (1937); Kimberly J.
Winbush, Annotation, Liability For Loss of Hat, Coat, or Other Property Deposited by Customer
167
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specifically with Missouri statutes and judicial decisions. Most of the classic
articles cite and quote at length many of the leading Missouri decisions, but
none are concerned primarily with them.
The purpose, therefore, of this article is to address lost property in
Missouri. Section I provides general history on lost property. Section II
discusses the debate on possession that occurs in the lost property context.
Section III deals with case law on lost property in Missouri and in other state
court cases. Section IV covers mislaid property in Missouri and in other
jurisdictions.
I. A BIT OF HISTORY
It has been said that the topic of lost and found property (while seemingly
simple) has provided some of the most difficult problems in the law of
possession.3 The law of finding lost chattels developed out of the common law
trover action. Now, trover is now enveloped into the present tort of
conversion, but, originally, was the historical remedy to determine the rights of
owners against finders.4 Trover (Fr. Trouver) means, of course, to find.5 It
was one of the forms of action to recover damages for the detention of a
chattel.6 Trover had its fictions because, under common law, the declaration
required that the plaintiff aver he possessed the goods, the defendant found the
same, and that the defendant converted the goods to his own use.7 A court
even applied this fiction in one case, it is said, where a railroad sought to
recover damages for the value of a locomotive engine wherein the owner
alleged he possessed the engine, that he had lost it, and the defendant found it.8
This fiction lasted until abolished in England in 1852 by the Common Law
Procedure Act.9

in Place of Business, 54 A.L.R.5th 393 (1997); Wanda E. Wakefield, Annotation, Validity,
Construction and Application of Lost or Abandoned Goods Statutes, 23 A.L.R.4th 1025 (1983);
J.A. Bock, Annotation, Right to Reward of Furnishing Information Leading to Arrest and
Conviction of Offender, 100 A.L.R.2d 573 (1965); J.P. Ludington, Annotation, Liability of Motor
Carrier for Loss of Passenger’s Baggage or Packages, 68 A.L.R.2d 1350 (1959); J.E. Keefe, Jr.,
Annotation, Rights in Respect of Lost, Mislaid, or Abandoned Property As Between Finder and
Person Upon Whose Property it is Found, 170 A.L.R. 706 (1947); Annotation, Carrier—Right to
Custody of Property Left by Passenger, 9 A.L.R. 1384 (1920).
3. David C. Hoath, Some Conveyancing Implications of “Finding” Disputes, in THE
CONVEYANCER AND PROPERTY LAWYER 348 (citing D.R. HARRIS, OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 80 (A.G. Guest ed. (1961)).
4. William L. Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 169 (1957).
5. Trover, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 314 (11th ed. 1910–11).
6. J.B. Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HARV. L. REV. 277, 286 (1897).
7. BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 227 (3d ed. 1923).
8. See generally Peacock v. Pittsburg Locomotive & Car Works, 52 Ga. 417, 419 (1874).
9. Trover, supra note 5, at 314.
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The Act invented a new writ to fill the gap left by the action of trespass,
which required an unlawful taking.10 This action became the modern tort of
conversion, which applies whenever the plaintiff is entitled to possession of
goods and the defendant acts inconsistently with the rights of the owner or
possessor to recover the value of the goods.11
II. THE ULTIMATE PROBLEM
The fundamental problem in this area is the age-old debate over how to
define “possession” and who is entitled to ultimate possession. The Missouri
cases attempt to determine the priority of interest between the finder and the
owner of the premises where the lost article is found.12 The ultimate question,
becomes then: who, as between the finder and the owner of the premises, is
entitled to possession?13
Professor Warren addressed this question:
To understand the importance of possession we shall have to go back
centuries. In the very early law great importance was attached to possession
by a man who said to the world “Keep off; this is mine.” The rudest people
have some notion of ownership, but in the common law in medieval times the
man in possession claiming to be owner was the owner. Seisen and possession
14
were interchangeable terms.

Possession was, and is, an interest to be protected. Possession under a
claim of title was title against a wrongdoer.15 In time, possession became title
against a wrongdoer.16 Hence, the basic question is: who, as between the
finder and the owner of premises, is entitled to “possession?” The next section
attempts to answer this question.

10. See Fouldes v. Willoughby, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1153, 1155 (distinguishing between
trover and trespass); JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 80 (1913); PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 4, at 89; Ames, supra note 6, at 286; A.W. Brian Simpson, The Introduction
of the Action on the Case for Conversion, 75 L.Q. REV. 864, 871 (1959); see also Johnson v.
Weedman, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 495, 496 (1843) (distinguishing the two remedies from conversion).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 228 (1965); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
2, at 88; EDWARD H. WARREN, TROVER AND CONVERSION: AN ESSAY 2 (1936); Prosser, supra
note 3, at 173–74; Edward H. Warren, Qualifying as a Plaintiff in an Action for Conversion, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1085 (1936) [hereinafter Warren, Action for Conversion].
12. See, e.g., Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 174 S.W. 376 (Mo. 1915); State ex rel.
Scott v. Buzard, 144 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
13. See Burke Shartel, Meanings of Possession, 16 MINN. L. REV. 611, 611 (1932) (quoting
Reg v. Smith, (1855) 6 Co. C. C. 554, 556).
14. Warren, Action for Conversion, supra note 11, at 1087.
15. Jeffries v. Great W. R.R. Co., (1856) 119 Eng. Rep. 680, 680 (K.B.).
16. The Winkfield, (1901) 165 Eng. Rep. 42, 46–47 (P.); Wilbraham v. Snow, (1670) 85
Eng. Rep. 624 (K.B); J.E. Macy, Annotation, Mere Possession in Plaintiff as Basis for
Wrongfully Taking or Damaging Personal Property, 150 A.L.R. 163, 180 (1943).
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III. DISTINCTIONS
The judicial decisions in Missouri may be few, but they are some of the
leading cases in the country on lost property. From the first case17 to one of
the later cases,18 Missouri has been fortunate to have well-written, thoughtful
opinions on lost property.
It might seem strange that there are no decisions to determine the priority
of right between the owner of lost property and the finder. This situation,
however, likely exists because cases do not usually determine the right of
ownership—the owner, of course, is always entitled to the lost property against
the finder.19 The law does not sanction the childish rhyme—“finders keepers,
losers weepers”—because property remains with the owner until he voluntarily
disposes of his title to the property.20
Take a typical but hypothetical situation: On a shopping trip to a
prominent, downtown Saint Louis department store, a woman finds a roll of
money (or a package) on the floor. She reports the find to the floor-manager,
who politely takes her name and address and informs her that in the event they
do not discover the owner, he will gladly get in touch with her. What is the
legal relationship between the store owner and the finder? Who is entitled to
the property? What policy considerations will the court follow to determine
which of the two should be entitled to the ownership? Would the decision be
the same if the property was found on the counter or in the private office of the
manager rather than on the floor? These and many other considerations
confront the courts, society, and the parties.
At the very outset, to provide any type of solution, one must analyze the
concept of “lost” property. Judicial decisions and scholarly works distinguish
between “abandoned property,” “treasure trove,” “mislaid,” and truly “lost”
property.21
17. State v. McCann, 19 Mo. 249 (Mo. 1853).
18. Allred v. Biegel, 219 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
19. Aigler, Rights of Finders, supra note 2, at 666.
20. Id. at 666–67.
21. The concept of abandoned property, treasure trove, and unclaimed property is beyond the
scope of this article and will not be dealt with in detail. But see Bemis v. The RMS Lusitania, 884
F. Supp. 1042, 1048–49 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that the salvager of the Lusitania was entitled
to the cargo and personal effects of the passengers). For the concept of abandoned property, see
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 270–71 (1951) (distinguishing the discovery of
abandoned property and larceny); Liscomb v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 199 F.2d 431, 435
(8th Cir. 1952) (addressing a conscious purpose to abandon); State v. Chevalier, 623 S.W.2d 42,
46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding finders need an honest belief that the property was abandoned to
take possession); St. Louis Dairy Co. v. Nw. Bottle Co., 204 S.W. 281, 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918)
(affirming the circuit court’s definition of “abandonment” as “a conscious purpose on the part of
the owner of personal property to so treat the same as to manifest an intention to thereafter neither
use nor re-take it into his possession”); Garth v. Everett, 16 Mo. 490, 492–93 (Mo. 1852)
(discussing slaves as abandoned property); BROWN, supra note 2, at 24; Comment, Lost, Mislaid,
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Professor Aigler, in his classic article, distinguishes these concepts.22
Property can be abandoned by the owner, and when a finder locates it and
takes possession, a “lost” article has been found.23 Or an article may be
intentionally placed by the owner in a certain place with the intention to resort
to it as soon as his diversion permits, the finder would say that a “lost” object
was found.24 Or a chattel may be inadvertently lost by the owner and, again,
the finder would claim to find a “lost” object.25 Thus, the distinctions between
“abandoned,” “mislaid,” and truly “lost” property.26
This distinction is clearly made in the Missouri Supreme Court case of
Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co.:
Property may be separated from the owner by being abandoned, or lost, or
mislaid. In the first instance, it goes back into a state of nature; or as is most
commonly expressed, it returns to the common mass and belongs to the first
finder, occupier, or taker. In the second instance, to be lost, it must have been
unintentionally or involuntarily parted with, in which case it is also an object
which may be found, and the finder is entitled to the possession against every
one but the true owner. But, if it is intentionally put down, it is not lost in a
legal sense, though the owner may not remember where he left it, and cannot
find it; for the “loss of goods in legal and common intendment, depends upon
something more than the knowledge or ignorance, the memory or want of
27
memory, of the owner at any given moment.”

and Abandoned Property, 8 FORDHAM L. REV. 222, 235–36 (1939); Aigler, Rights of Finders,
supra note 2, at 668 (explaining that abandoned property belongs to the first person who takes
possession); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 3 (1994) (defining
abandoned property); 1 MO. DIG., Abandoned and Lost Goods § 1 (1905) (defining abandonment
as “the relinquishment or surrender of rights or property by one person to another”). As to
unclaimed property, see Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§
447.500–447.595 (1994) (setting forth rules for unclaimed property); L.R. James, Annotation,
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 98 A.L.R.2d 304 (1964) (providing a method
for disposition of unclaimed property). As to treasure trove, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 28
(defining treasure trove as “article of gold and silver, intentionally hidden for safety in the earth
or in some secret place, the owner being unknown”); Note, Treasure Trove—History and
Development, 22 TEMPLE L.Q. 326 (1949) (explaining that treasure trove typically goes to the
finder); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property § 39 (1994) (explaining the
difference between American and English treasure trove laws); Annotation, Modern Status of
Rules as to Ownership of Treasure Trove as Between Finder and Owner of Property on Which
Found, 61 A.L.R.4th 1180 (1988) (analyzing state and federal cases where the courts considered
ownership of treasure trove).
22. Aigler, Rights of Finders, supra note 2, at 664–66.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 666.
25. Id. at 664.
26. Id. at 664–66.
27. 174 S.W. 376, 378 (Mo. 1915) (quoting Lawrence v. State, 20 Tenn. (1 Hum.) 228
(1839)).
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Therefore, simply put, “mislaid” property is that which the owner of the
goods intentionally or negligently places the property where it can again be
resorted to him, but then forgets it. “Lost” property is that which the owner or
other possessor has involuntarily parted with it through inadvertence,
negligence, or carelessness. Often, this is a difficult question to determine.
IV. MISLAID PROPERTY
The law seems well-settled, not only in Missouri, but also elsewhere, that
mislaid property rests in the possession of the owner of the locus, not the finder
who actually seized the object, and that the owner is entitled to recover or
retain the object.28
The Missouri case of State v. McCann29 forcibly brought out this rule. The
government charged and tried McCann for grand larceny for taking a wallet
belonging to Eatherton.30 While trading in a store in Saint Louis County and
purchasing a few objects, Eatherton laid his wallet down on the counter and
left the store, forgetting the wallet.31 McCann saw him place the object on the
counter.32 After leaving the store, Eatherton realized that he “lost” the wallet
and returned to the store to recover it.33 Not finding it there, Eatherton
overtook McCann and stopped him.34 McCann asked Eatherton, “Are you the
man who lost the purse?”35 Eatherton replied, “Yes, I lost mine.”36 With that,
McCann turned over some of the money, but not all, and the government
charged him with grand larceny.37

28. See generally 1 AM. JUR. 2D, §§ 36–39 (2005) (presenting law of mislaid property as
applicable to finders and owners).
29. 19 Mo. 249 (Mo. 1853). See also Norris v. Camp, 144 F.2d 1, 3 (10th Cir. 1944)
(holding never-sold municipal bonds found in safe deposit box remained property of city, not
finder); McAvoy v. Medina, 11 Mass. (1 Allen) 548, 549 (1866) (holding shopowner, not finder,
was entitled to wallet found on store table); Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 174 S.W. 376,
376 (Mo. 1915) (holding bank, not finder, was entitled to envelope of cash found in safe-deposit
room); Foulke v. N.Y. Consolidated R.R. Co., 127 N.E. 237, 238–39 (N.Y. 1920) (holding that a
package containing a loaf of bread found on the seat of a railroad car was not “lost” and the
Railroad was entitled to it rather than the passenger); Jackson v. Steinberg, 205 P.2d 562, 565
(Or. 1949) (holding hotel owner was entitled to found money over employee who made
discovery); Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 39 S.E.2d 308, 311 (Va. 1946) (holding hotel owner,
not finder, was entitled to diamond broach found in room).
30. McCann, 19 Mo. at 249.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 250.
35. McCann, 19 Mo. at 252.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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The defendant rested his defense on the words used in the basic question
presented above.38 He argued that “lost” meant actually and legally lost; thus
he could not have been guilty of obtaining possession by trespass.39 The court,
in affirming the conviction, struck down this argument and, resting its decision
on precedent, concluded that leaving the object on the counter did not result in
lost property:
It was not, in reality, so lost, that larceny could not be charged against the
finder, who saw the owner leave it.
....
. . . The weight of authority is against considering property situated as the
purse of Eatherton was, in this case, so lost that larceny could not be
40
committed of it.

The two leading Missouri decisions dealing with mislaid property are
Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co.41 and State ex rel. Scott v. Buzard,42 which
held that as between the finder and the owner of the locus when the article was
misplaced, the owner is entitled to the find.
In Foster, a bank customer brought an action to recover possession of an
envelope containing $180 “found” by Foster in the defendant company’s place
of business.43 The defendant company maintained individual safes in a
building in Kansas City, Missouri, which it rented to customers, and each of
these compartments contained a safe-deposit box where the customers placed
valuables and from which the customers could withdraw.44 To open one of
these boxes required two keys, one held by the customer, and one held by a
company employee.45 A customer, to get to his box, would enter from the
street through the bank, then through a steel gate, and then into a vault, where
he and the attendant would open his compartment, the customer would take out
his box, and then proceed to a small room containing a desk and chair where
he could examine his valuables.46
The plaintiff followed this procedure and, after taking his box, entered the
private room, and as he was about to leave, he noticed an envelope lying on the
desk corner that seemed a “little puffy.”47 He opened it and found $180.48 The

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
McCann, 19 Mo. at 252–54.
174 S.W. 376 (Mo. 1915).
144 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
Foster, 174 S.W. at 377.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Foster, 174 S.W. at 377.
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envelope lacked an identifying mark.49 The plaintiff turned it over to the
defendant, but after a period of time the owner was not found, and the plaintiff
demanded the return of the money.50 Upon the company’s refusal to deliver it,
the plaintiff sued the defendant company.51 The court concisely framed the
issue as: “The question for decision, therefore, is not who owns the money, but
which of the parties is entitled to possession of it, or, better stated, which is the
proper custodian”52 Reasoning that the defendant bank was properly entitled
to the money, the court said:
Now, in whose possession was the money when discovered by plaintiff? It
could scarcely have been more in defendant’s possession, unless it had been in
the pocket of one of its officers. . . . A roguish street urchin, if by possibility he
had gained access to this place and discovered the envelope on the desk, would
have had the same right to it that the plaintiff had. Suppose the attendant had
observed the boy as he found it; would he have been justified in letting him
carry it off? Would it not have been his duty to assert defendant’s right of
possession and to take it from the boy? Would not the real owner, had he
afterwards appeared, have had legal ground of complaint against defendant, as
his bailee, for gross neglect in allowing the money to be carried off in full
53
view?

The same legal principle, that mislaid property should be awarded to the
owner of the locus, was used in State ex. rel. Scott v. Buzard.54 In that case,
the Bonded Wrecking and Lumber Company, engaged in the business of
wrecking and salvaging old buildings in Kansas City, Missouri, purchased a
residence in Kansas City and proceeded to remove the building.55 The
company employed Johnson as a common laborer and, while the work was in
progress, a part of the wall fell, revealing a metal box that Johnson found while
cleaning mortar from the bricks of the building.56 The box contained gold,
paper certificates, and money with a total value of $12,700.57 The court held
that Johnson was not entitled to possession of the valuables as he did not have
the right of possession of any part of the building or anything found inside.58
Johnson had none of the rights of a finder since the court reasoned that this
property was not lost:

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Foster, 174 S.W. at 377.
144 S.W.2d 847 (1940).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 849.
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Now, the authorities, as a general rule, hold that money or other property
voluntarily laid down is not, in legal contemplation, lost, and that the owner of
the shop, bank, or other place where it is left is the proper custodian rather than
the person who happens to discover it, as well, also, as to all other persons
59
except the owner.

Danielson v. Roberts60 is one of the few other cases besides Buzard that
deals with property found in a building or receptacle. In Danielson, two young
boys sued for the conversion of gold coins they found in an old chicken house
while employed by the defendants.61 While so employed, they dug up an old
rust-eaten half-gallon tin can containing a number of musty and partially
decayed tobacco sacks filled with gold coins which they brought to the defendant.62 The defendant dismissed the boys summarily with “Here’s five
cents boys . . . . Don’t say anything about it, and the Lord will bless you.”63
The can contained over $7,000.64 The court, obviously impressed with the
emotional appeal of the circumstances, awarded the money to the boys, stating
that the fact that they found the money on the defendant’s premises or that the
plaintiffs were his employees at the time cannot affect the plaintiff’s right to
possession.65
Why should courts, when mislaid property is involved, turn their favor to
the owner of the premises and not the finder? What possible policy reason can
be behind the award? Is there not an “intuitive sympathy” for the finder? The
answer lies, it seems, in two basic considerations: 1) The owner of the locus
has possession of the mislaid article prior to that of the finder, and 2) the true
owner had possession before either the finder or the owner of the locus. South
Staffordshire Water Company v. Sharman66 expressed this principle: “The
possession of land carries with it in general, by our law, possession of
everything which is attached to or under the land, and . . . the right to possess it
also.”67
In the case of mislaid property, as in Foster, McCann, and Buzard, the
property which is intentionally placed by the owner and then forgotten comes
into the possession of the locus’ owner. The owner, without even knowing of

59. Buzard, 144 S.W.2d at 849 (quoting Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement
Co., 70 S.W. 878, 880 (Mo. 1902)).
60. 74 P. 913 (Or. 1904).
61. Id. at 913.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Danielson, 74 P. at 914–15. But cf. Ferguson v. Ray, 77 P. 600, 603 (Or. 1904)
(awarding a similarly unearthed discovery to the owner of the locus in quo).
66. (1896) 2 Q.B. 44.
67. Id. at 46 (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK & ROBERT S. WRIGHT, ESSAY ON POSSESSION
IN THE COMMON LAW 41 (1888)).
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its existence, has intent to possess the mislaid article because he has expressed
intent to possess the item through his general intent to possess all on his
property.
Secondly, while there is an intuitive sympathy for a finder, the courts must
somehow look to the interests of the true owner, and in doing so, must look to
the place where the owner mislaid the article. In many cases, the owner
mislaid the property on premises which were not open to the general public.68
In Foster, the owner mislaid the envelope containing the money in a private
vault room of the bank to which only few persons were admitted, and not in
the bank lobby.69
Therefore, the occupier is entitled to possession of the mislaid article, not
because the article is mislaid, but because of the place where the article is
found. If found in a place where the general public is not generally admitted,
the interests of the owner should be protected and the occupier of the premises
is under a duty to care for the goods mislaid by those who are entitled to use
the private or semiprivate accommodations.
V. LOST PROPERTY
Ever since the early leading case of Armory v. Delamirie,70 involving the
chimney sweeper’s boy who found a jewel in a chimney and was cheated by an
avaricious goldsmith, was decided by Lord Chief Justice Pratt, the law has
been settled that the finder of a chattel enables the finder to keep it against all
the world except its rightful owner, and to defend it against all others with
every remedy which is available to a bailee.71
This is and has been the general principle of the law of lost property
throughout the centuries.72 One of the leading cases in the United States is the

68. See, e.g., Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 174 S.W. 376 (Mo. 1915).
69. Id.
70. (1772) 93 Eng. Rep. 664.
71. Id. at 664. See generally 1 AM. JUR. 2D §§ 12–13 (2005) (discussing types of property
commonly defined as lost). In Durfee v. Jones, a blacksmith found a roll of money secreted in an
old safe which was left with him. 11 R.I. 588, 591 (1877). The Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the finder was entitled to the money as against the owner of the safe who did not know it
was there. Id. In State v. Conway, a steamboat in Saint Louis blew up at the riverfront and threw
a safe containing gold and silver into the river, which the defendant and others retrieved several
months later. 18 Mo. 321 (Mo. 1853). The defendant was charged with larceny, but the court
held they were finders and under proper instructions could not be guilty of larceny. Id. See also
Parker v. British Airways Bd., (1982) 1 Q.B. 1004 (finding that the finder of a gold bracelet,
found in the executive lounge of Heathrow Airport, was entitled to recover damages against
British Airways which sold the bracelet).
72. See, e.g., In re Seizure of $82,000 More or Less, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 (W.D. Mo.
2000); Flood v. City Nat’l Bank of Clinton, 253 N.W. 509, 512 (Iowa 1934); Foster v. Fidelity
Safe Deposit Co., 174 S.W. 376, 378 (Mo. 1915); State v. Montgomery, 79 S.W. 673, 695–96
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Missouri decision of Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co.73
The defendant, Forest Park Highlands, was an amusement park in Saint
Louis.74 In the summer of 1898, the plaintiff attended an open air performance
at the park, and after the performance, sat down at one of the tables and found
a pocketbook lying on the ground under the table.75 He attracted the attention
of several persons, including the head waiter, a private watchman, and the
manager of the premises.76 Each in turn asked that the pocketbook be turned
over to him, but Hoagland refused, saying that he would deliver the purse only
to a uniformed policeman or the ticket office.77 Scherf (the manager) became
angry, and ordered the other employee to arrest the plaintiff.78 In doing so, the
employees disarranged the plaintiff’s clothing, and roughly handled him.79
They did succeed, however, in arresting him.80 The trial court denied
compensatory damages and awarded one cent in punitive damages; he then
appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court urging error in the giving of the
following instruction:
The court instructs the jury that the defendant Forest Park Highlands
Amusement Company not only had the right, but was in duty bound, to
exercise reasonable care to protect, for the true owner, all valuables
inadvertently mislaid or lost upon its premises; and if the jury find that the
defendant company and Henry Scherf, its manager, only endeavored to obtain
from the plaintiff valuables so found for the purpose of keeping the same safe
for the true owner, then their request was not unreasonable, and the defendants
had the lawful right to eject the plaintiff from said premises upon his refusal to
comply with their request, and in doing so the defendants could use such force
81
as was necessary.

The Missouri Supreme Court, speaking through Judge Burgess, held this
instruction incorrect, and reversed for a new trial, stating: “All of the
authorities hold that the finder of a lost chattel is entitled to its possession as
against all other persons except the true owner.”82 The finder, the court said,

(Mo. 1904); Million, supra note 1, at 32; Eldon R. James, Notes on Recent Missouri Cases, 10 U.
MO. BULL. L. SERIES 1, 52 (1916).
73. 70 S.W. 878 (Mo. 1902).
74. Id. at 879.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Hoagland, 70 S.W. at 879.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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“has a special property in the chattel found, sufficient to maintain trover
against every person except the true owner.”83
Why should the courts protect the finder when property is found on the
ground in Hoagland and at the same time protect the occupier of premises
when property is mislaid? Should the outcome of a decision be based upon the
slim distinction between lost and mislaid property? Suppose, in Hoagland, the
pocketbook was found on the table, instead of on the ground. Suppose that the
owner placed it on the table, and then a passerby, without knowledge, pushed it
off onto the ground. Should the decision be determined on the sole basis of
where the article is found? Besides this distinction between lost and mislaid
property, there are more fundamental reasons why the court should award the
pocketbook to the plaintiff. The pocketbook was found in an open amusement
park to which the public was invited under circumstances which would justify
the court to be sympathetic toward the finder.84 The Forest Park Highlands did
not intend to exclude persons from its premises.85 It was he who restored the
article to circulation, and it was his sharp eyes that permitted the object to be
returned to the “mass of usable things.”86 It was he toward whom the court
was intuitively sympathetic.87
In examining the decisions in which the finder is entitled to the object, it is
surprising to note that the goods were found on public premises, where not
only the public traveled, but where the public was invited. It seems correct,
then, to award the object to the finder, under circumstances that the owner’s
interests will be as well protected if the object is awarded to the finder rather
than the occupier of the premises.
VI. PROPERTY EMBEDDED IN THE SOIL
For this writer, it seems that a distinction must be made between money or
other articles found embedded in the soil. Where the object has become a part
of the realty, the owner of the realty should be awarded the object, over the
finder, as he not only owns the realty, but has possession prior to the finder.
This principle should apply whether the finder is a tenant88 or a licensee.89 The

83. Hoagland, 70 S.W. at 880. Compare with Armory v. Delamirie, (1772) 93 Eng. Rep.
664, 664 (“[T]he finder of a jewel, though he does not by such finding acquire an absolute
property or ownership, yet he has such a property as will enable him to keep it against all but the
rightful owner, and consequently may maintain trover.”). In this author’s opinion, the Missouri
court’s language is obviously too broad.
84. See Hoagland, 70 S.W. at 879.
85. See id. at 879.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 881.
88. Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., (1886) 33 Ch. D. 562, 567; Goodard v. Winchell, 52 N.W.
1124, 1126 (Iowa 1892) (holding that a meteorite embedded in the soil should be awarded to the
landowner).
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leading case in this area in Missouri is Allred v. Beigel.90 In Beigel, the
plaintiffs went swimming in the Chariton River at a point where a new channel
of the river ran through land originally owned by Haney.91 Haney devised the
land to his wife for life, and then in fee to his daughter, Mrs. Evans.92 This
was the status of the property at the time the find was made.93
The plaintiff, while swimming, found an old Indian canoe, one third of
which was embedded in the soil, fifteen to twenty-five feet below the surface
of the land.94 It extended about six inches above the water, and the remainder
was submerged in the water.95 The Osage Indians at one time inhabited the
area where the plaintiffs found the canoe.96 The Kansas City Court of Appeals
denied the plaintiffs’ contentions that they should be entitled to the canoe on
the basis of being finders.97 The court held that the canoe became a part of the
realty, and was “property embedded in the soil.”98 In such a case, the court
said, “it is held that the presumption is that the finder has no rights therein, the
presumption being the possession is in the owner of the locus in quo.”99
The court relied on Elwes v. Brigg Gas Company100 and Goddard v.
Winchell101 in reaching a conclusion. In Brigg, the plaintiff leased a portion of
his land to the Brigg Gas Company, and in the course of certain excavations by
the Gas Company, they discovered, embedded in the clay, some feet below the
surface, an ancient prehistoric ship or boat hallowed out of a large oak tree and
measuring about forty-five feet in length.102 When discovered, it was lying
embedded in the clay at a depth from the surface, of four feet at one end and

89. Allred v. Biegel, 219 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949); see also Ralph W. Aigler,
Note, Finding Lost Goods–Ancient Indian Canoe, 48 MICH. L. REV. 368, 369 (1950) (reviewing
basis for plaintiff’s claim); David W. Dardano, Note, Personal Property—Chattels Embedded in
the Soil, 29 OR. L. REV. 157, 157 (1950) (comparing embedded property to property found on the
soil’s surface); Frank M. Mayfield, Jr., Note, Personal Property—Finder v. Life Tenant, Life
Tenant v. Remainderman, WASH. U. L.Q. 272, 273 (1950) (explaining why canoe was not
personal property); Gibson Gayle, Note, Property—Rights of Finders of Lost Canoe Embedded in
Realty, 2 BAYLOR L. REV. 110, 110 (1949) (noting respective rights of landowner and
remainderman).
90. 219 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
91. Id. at 665.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 666.
95. Allred, 219 S.W.2d at 666.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. (1886) 33 Ch.D. 562 (U.K.).
101. 52 N.W. 1124 (Iowa 1892).
102. Elwes, 33 Ch.D. at 563.
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six feet at the other.103 The boat was not petrified or fossilized.104 The court
decided that the plaintiff, as the owner of the land at the time of the lease
agreement, was entitled to the boat.105 Even if the boat can be regarded as a
chattel, the property interest should be vested in the plaintiff and thus the
defendants were accordingly ordered to deliver the boat to the plaintiff.106
How a Missouri court would decide a case involving money or coin buried
in the earth is difficult to say. On the basis of Allred v. Beigel and State ex rel
Scott v. Buzard, it should seem that such property being “intentionally placed,”
and hence “mislaid,” should be awarded to the owner of the locus.107
VII. THE APPLICABLE MISSOURI STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are several statutes in Missouri which must be followed before the
finder of lost property is entitled to absolute ownership of the objects found. I
dare say that not many persons know of these statutes, and there are little, if
any, judicial decisions giving guidance to the general public and the courts.
Sections 447.010 through 447.110 of the Missouri statutes deal specifically
with the duties of a finder under Missouri law.108
How many people know what their duties are under the Missouri statutes
to become the final owner of “lost” property? While people could research
these statutes, in reality, the statutes are largely unknown to the general
population. Yet it is incumbent on the finder to follow the statutes passed by
the General Assembly to become the true and final owner of “lost” property.
Section 447.010 provides that finders have certain duties:
If any person finds any money, goods, rights in action, or other personal
property, or valuable thing whatever, of the value of ten dollars or more, the
owner of which is unknown, he shall within ten days, make an affidavit before
some judge of the circuit court of the county, other than a municipal judge,
stating when and where he found the same, that the owner is unknown to him,
109
and that he has not secreted, withheld or disposed of any part thereof.

After the affidavit is filed, the circuit judge “shall summon three
disinterested householders to appraise” the property, make an oath, and deliver
the report to the finder.110 Section 447.030 then provides that the judge shall
file this list, and the finder shall transmit a copy to the clerk of the “county

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Id.
See supra notes 41–42, 90–99 and accompanying text.
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 447.010–447.110 (2000).
Id. § 447.010 (emphasis added).
Id. § 447.020 (emphasis added).
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commission” and publicize on the courthouse door and four other public places
a copy of such evaluation.111
Section 447.040 provides that if no owner appears within forty days, the
finder shall, within thirty days, cause a copy of the description of the property
to be inserted in some newspaper for three weeks, and if no owner appears
within one year after the publication, the “same” shall vest in the finder.112
Section 447.050, however, provides that if the owner appears within one year
and proves the property and pays all reasonable charges, the finder shall
restore the same to him.113
The harsh section is 447.060. If any person finds any money, property, or
other valuable thing, and fails to make discovery as required by Chapter 447,
he must forfeit to the owner double the value thereof.114
These statutes have been on the books for decades. But there are no
judicial decisions interpreting them. How many persons follow these
procedures? No one knows. It seems that the statutory provisions apply only
to truly “lost” property and not “mislaid” property.115 The General Assembly
should reexamine these statutes and determine whether they are realistic and
whether they comply with the judicial decisions relating to the common law of
finding lost articles.
VIII. FINDER’S STANDING TO BRING ACTION
One of the most difficult and controversial questions in this area of the law
is the question of who may maintain an action in “trover and conversion”
against a subsequent third party.116 Most of the decisions deal with bailments
but the same principles would apply in the case of finders.
The medieval doctrine, as Professor Warren points out in Qualifying as
Plaintiff in an Action for Conversion,117 was that possession under a claim of
ownership was title against a wrongdoer.118 But under the classic cases in the

111. Id. § 447.030.
112. Id. § 447.040.
113. MO. REV. STAT. § 447.050 (2000) (emphasis added).
114. Id. § 447.060.
115. Id. § 447.010 (failing to provide differential definitions for “lost” as opposed to
“mislaid” property).
116. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 2, at 311; BURKE, supra note 2, at 118; PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 2, at 102; WARREN, supra note 11, at 1098; Annotation, Macy, supra note
16, at 180; W.W. Allen, Right of Action for Conversion as Affected by Assertion of Rights or
Pursuit of Remedies Founded on Continued Ownership of the Property, Annotation, 3 A.L.R.2d
218 (1949).
117. See Warren, Action for Conversion, supra note 11, at 1098 (discussing the possessor’s
ability to maintain trover against a wrongdoer).
118. See also Jeffries v. Great W. R.R. Co., (1856) 119 Eng. Rep. 680, 680 (K.B.) (holding
that “mere possession is sufficient title as against a wrongdoer”).
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English law of possession, a title against any wrongdoer and any possessor
including the finder has sufficient interest to sue in trover and conversion and
recover the actual value of the chattel.119
Possession is title against the whole world except the real owner. In
Armory, damages were awarded in the value of the jewel which the chimneysweep boy found to the tune of the “finest water.”120 The action of trover and
conversion in the early law, and the present, is that of a forced sale. The
plaintiff obtains the value of the goods and the defendant obtains title.121
But Armory and the finding cases do not deal with the situation as between
the owner of the article after the finder or bailee has sued for and recovers the
actual value of the article and a judgment is satisfied. What if the owner
appears after the finder sues and recovers the value of the chattel? Is the owner
entitled to recover his property from the defendant who has paid the actual
value to the finder who has brought suit against the third party, or must he look
to the finder? The doctrine is that once the bailee (finder) has recovered the
actual value of the property from a subsequent wrongdoer, the owner is barred
from maintaining a separate action against the third party.122
Title in a third party (jus tertii) is no defense in an action of conversion,
unlike a replevin action.123 This area of the law of finding has not yet been
fully developed in Missouri—i.e., to determine the interests of the true owner
and a third party who has paid a judgment to the finder, brought suit, and
recovered the full value of the chattel. But it is clear that since the classic case
of Armory v. Delamirie, all the decisions hold that possession without more is
title against the whole world except the true owner.

119. See The Winkfield, (1901) 165 Eng. Rep. 42, 46–47 (explaining that a bailee has the
right to bring an action against the wrongdoer); Wilbraham v. Snow, (1670) 85 Eng. Rep. 624,
624 (K.B) (holding that a possessor “may maintain trover for a conversion by a stranger”);
Armory v. Delamirie, (1772) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (K.B.) (holding that a finder may maintain a
trover action against anyone but the true owner). See also State ex rel. Lipic v. Flynn, 215
S.W.2d 446, 451 (Mo. 1948) (en banc) (explaining that a plaintiff must “have had or been entitled
to immediate possession at the time of the conversion and thereafter” to bring an action for trover
and conversion).
120. 93 Eng. Rep. at 664.
121. Id.
122. See Winkfield, 165 Eng. Rep. at 42.
123. See Jackson v. City of Columbia, 217 S.W. 869, 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920) (explaining
that “it is a good defense to a replevin suit to show that general ownership is in someone other
than the plaintiff”); Strothkamp v. St. John’s Cmty. Bank, Inc., 329 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. 1959)
(explaining that “the damages allowed for a wrongful detention not involving a taking or
deprivation of ownership are only such as are appropriate for the deprivation of possession” in a
replevin lawsuit).
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IX. RECENT COMPARABLE DECISIONS RELYING ON MISSOURI DECISIONS
Although there are not as many Missouri decisions on the law of finding as
there are in other areas of the law, Missouri’s decisions are comparable to
other state court decisions in that they have laid out extensive groundwork and
have been influential in more recent decisions.
One Illinois case which relied on Foster is Paset v. Old Orchard Bank and
Trust Co.124 There, the plaintiff found money in the defendant bank’s safety
deposit box area and a dispute arose between the “finder” and the bank.125 The
Illinois Court, relying, in part, on Foster, held that the bank had a priority
interest in the find because this effectuates the goal of restoring the property to
the true owner.126
The distinction between “mislaid” and “lost” property, as recognized in
Foster, was interestingly brought out in Benjamin v. Lindner Aviation, Inc.127
In that case, Mr. Heath Benjamin found $18,000 in currency located in the
wing of an airplane owned by a bank.128 A dispute arose between Linder
Aviation Co., which was servicing the plane for the bank-owner, and
Benjamin, a Linder employee.129 In servicing the plane, Benjamin removed
some panels from the sign’s underside.130 Inside the left wing, Benjamin
discovered two packets wrapped in foil containing money.131 Benjamin filed
an affidavit claiming he was the finder and entitled to the money.132
In ruling on Benjamin’s claim, the court distinguished between lost,
mislaid, and abandoned property and held that the money was mislaid:
We think there was substantial evidence to find that the currency
discovered by Benjamin was mislaid property. . . .
The place where Benjamin found the money and the manner in which it
was hidden are also important here. The bills were carefully tied and wrapped
and then concealed in a location that was accessible only by removing screws
133
and a panel.

124. 378 N.E.2d 1264, 1271 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (citing Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co.,
174 S.W. 376, 376 (Mo. 1915)); see also Dennis v. Nw. Nat’l. Bank, 81 N.W.2d 254 (Minn.
1957) (similarly dealing with a finding involving an employee of a bank).
125. Paset, 378 N.E.2d at 1266–67.
126. Id. at 1271.
127. 534 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1995).
128. Id. at 403.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Benjamin, 534 N.W.2d at 403.
133. Id. at 406.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

184

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:167

The court went on to hold that the “premises” on which the money was
found was the airplane and not Linder’s premises; thus awarding the money to
the plane owner—the bank.134
Several other cases have dealt with the law of lost property. In Powell v.
Four Thousand Six Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency,135 certain individuals
found $4,600 along a road and notified the county sheriff of the find.136 After
several months, the sheriff commenced an action to obtain permission to
deposit the money in the sheriff’s training fund and the finders objected.137
The Oklahoma court held that the finders were entitled to the find and not the
sheriff.138 The finder of lost property, the court held, acquired rights superior
to the sheriff’s rights.139
Several recent cases, however, held the finder was not entitled to the find.
In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. $7,000 in U.S. Currency,140 and in In re
Funds in the Possession of Conemaugh Township Supervisors,141 police
officers who found property in the course of their duties were not entitled to
the find because the public faith in law enforcement would be undermined by
permitting the officer to assert a claim against the property.142
A case similar to the Missouri Allred v. Biegel is In the Matter of the
Search and Seizure of Shivers,143 decided by a Texas district court. A metal
detectorist in the Angelina National Forest, pursuant to a search warrant, found
certain property.144 In determining who had rights to the property, the court
concluded that property embedded in the soil did not belong to the finder.145
In Elridge v. Herman,146 conflicting claims by two tenants to property
found in the basement by one of the tenants confronted the Iowa Supreme
Court (the building owner claimed no interest in the money).147 The defendant
found approximately $70,000 in the basement of the rented home while

134. Id. at 408.
135. 904 P.2d 153 (Ok. App. 1995); compare with Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands
Amusement Co., 70 S.W. 878, 878 (Mo. 1902) (plaintiff found a pocketbook at an amusement
park).
136. Powell, 904 P.2d at 153–54.
137. Id. at 154.
138. Id. at 155.
139. Id.
140. 742 A.2d 711 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
141. 753 A.2d 788, 791 (Pa. 2000).
142. $7,000 in U.S.Currency, 742 A.2d at 713–14; Funds in the Possession, 753 A.2d at 791.
143. 890 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Tex. 1995); reh’g denied, 900 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Tex. 1995),
aff’d, United States v. Shivers, 96 F.3d 120 (1996).
144. Shivers, 890 F. Supp. at 614.
145. Id. at 616; compare with Allred v. Biegel, 219 S.W.2d 665, 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949)
(finding that an embedded canoe belonged to the owner of the land, not the finder).
146. 291 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 1980).
147. Id. at 321–22.
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working on his motorcycle.148 Another tenant, the plaintiff, claimed the money
was his and that he obtained it through the sale of “illicit commodities.”149 On
cross-examination, the plaintiff repeatedly exercised his privilege against selfincrimination.150 The court held that the plaintiff’s claim of privilege created
an inference to reject his testimony and, therefore, that the money was “lost”
and belonged to the finder.151
CONCLUSION
The Missouri cases in found, lost, and mislaid property are sound. Recent
cases from other jurisdictions cite them for their sound legal analysis. Property
which has been mislaid in a private or semiprivate place should, in all fairness,
be held by the occupier of the locus so that the article’s owner may
expeditiously have the property returned. Property which is technically lost,
especially in a public or semipublic place, should be awarded to the finder until
the true owner shows himself. This, Hoagland decides.152 The fine distinction
between lost property and mislaid property, made in many of the decisions in
other jurisdictions is highly artificial and arbitrary, and provides no logical
basis for awarding the article found to either the finder or the occupier. The
Missouri decisions seem to break through this artificial distinction, and award
the articles to the one who would most likely protect it for the true owner, or at
least be in the best position to do so.
The statutory provisions are overly burdensome on a person who
voluntarily takes possession of lost goods. Instead, what is required is a swift,
streamlined procedure that any person not familiar with the law could easily
understand. The statutory enactments, originally passed in 1817,153 have not
been radically amended since that time, and should be updated and
modernized.
On the whole, Missouri has rendered sound and logical decisions in the
small, but fascinating, segment of the law on lost property.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 320, 321.
Id. at 322.
Id.
Elridge, 291 N.W.2d at 322.
Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 70 S.W. 878, 880 (Mo. 1902).
LAWS OF THE STRAYS, 1 TERR. LAWS § 205-58-378 (1817).
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